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theorists and some evidence suggest these efforts will be ineffective or even could perversely crowd
out altruistic efforts. Prior papers examining the impact of tax incentives for donations generally
report zero or negative coefficients. We argue these studies incorrectly define their tax variables,
and rely on difference-in-differences methods despite likely failures of the requisite parallel trends
assumption. We therefore aim to identify the causal effect of tax incentive legislation to serve
as an organ donor on living related and unrelated kidney donation rates in the U.S states using
more precise tax data and allowing for heterogenous and time-variant causal effects. Employing
a synthetic control method, we find that the passage of tax incentive legislation increased living
unrelated kidney donation rates by about 52 percent in New York relative to a comparable
synthetic New York in the absence of legislation. We show that this causal effect is robust to the
exclusion of any particular state as well as to the use of a very small number of comparison states.
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1 Introduction
Can altruism be bought? Prior literature, dating back to Olson (1971), emphasizes the importance of
“selective incentives” or private goods in encouraging individual contributions to group goals. At the same
time, some studies, many in the laboratory, suggest that explicit monetary incentives may have minimal or
even perverse effects.1 Titmuss (1970) famously argued that paying for blood donations would undermine
social norms of generosity and reduce giving.
Organ donations are a policy area where these theoretical questions are especially pressing. Earlier
qualitative research generally confirms that non-monetary selective incentives, such as the development of
emotional and associative bonds between donors and donees, can contribute importantly to expanding the
donor base.2 Perhaps inspired by these efforts, a number of U.S. states have enacted tax incentives for living
organ donors.
In four previous studies, however, researchers employing difference-in-differences (DiD) methods have
consistently failed to find any evidence that these incentives affected kidney donations, which comprise
the large majority of demand for and supply of donations. Wellington and Sayre (2011) report that state
legislation is not associated with overall living donations. Venkataramani et al. (2012) find no statistically
significant contemporaneous or lagged effects of tax policy on donation rates, or differential effects by gender,
race or donor relationship. They hypothesize that the statistically indistinguishable effects may stem from
low cash value of the tax deduction to defray costs faced by donors, lack of public awareness and a depletion
of organ donor pools in the pre-legislation period. Lacetera et al. (2014) find significant effects for bone
marrow but not other organs. Boulware et al. (2008) find that state legislation and federal policies are not
associated with living related or overall donations. They do find a positive effect on living unrelated kidney
donations when pooling together all state legislation, but do not separately analyze monetary incentives.
While all four studies largely reach a consensus, they share a number of methodological and data issues
in the identification of causal effects of the law that leave their conclusions open to question.
Pooling cross-section and time-series data may cloud any potentially significant effect one might have
observed if these effects were analyzed by a state-by-state pure time-series analysis. On the other hand, a
pure time-series analysis of the law and kidney donations would be contaminated by structural shocks.
Compositional differences and non-parallel trends may pose threats to the validity of DiD estimation.
That is, the distribution of the law and the covariates that are thought to affect kidney donation rates
may not be similar for the pre- and post-legislation periods or the treatment (i.e. states that passed the
legislation) and control states (i.e. no legislation) may not have experienced the same trends in the absence
of the law conditional on covariates. As Boulware et al. (2008) show graphically, the trend lines for enacting
and non-enacting states cross prior to the enactment period (though Boulware et al. (2008) do not note the
econometric significance of that fact). Further, there are good reasons to suspect that tax incentives tend to
be enacted near the peak of public attention to the organ donation crisis, implying the likelihood of regression
to the mean in enacting but not necessarily non-enacting states.
The prior studies also face a set of other identification challenges. Each treats enactment of tax legislation
as a binary variable, when in fact the real dollar value of the incentives states offer ranges from a few hundred
to ten thousand dollars. In addition to failing to account for this variation, prior papers overlooked two states
that enacted credits, not deductions. Next, 70 percent of all U.S states have passed either a paid leave of
absence and/or a tax deduction/credit legislation between the 1990s and 2010. For a state that subsequently
1Gneezy et al. (2011) offer a review.
2See Healy (2010) for a review.
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passed both of these legislations, one may not be able to isolate the causal effect of one from the other.
Lastly, the enactment of tax incentive legislation may not be exogenous to kidney donations. In this case,
one should resort to an instrumental variable procedure where another variable should be found such that
it moves around the covariate of interest (i.e. the law) in a way that can plausibly be viewed as random.
We argue that finding such an exogenous source of variation - a plausible instrument for the enactment and
value of each state’s tax incentive - is very difficult.
We therefore propose another strategy that is robust to the above-mentioned problems provided that its
identifying assumptions are met. We employ the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003;
Abadie et al., 2010, 2014) where we create a synthetic control group that replicates the-pre legislation living
kidney donation rates of the states that enacted a tax incentive legislation by using a convex combination of
other states that have not enacted any legislation. For the sake of completeness and for purposes of cross-
validation we also perform (1) a DiD approach à la Bertrand et al. (2004) where the tax incentive legislation
is captured by a binary variable, and (2) a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation where
the real dollar value of the legislation is measured accurately and captured an endogenous treatment.
We find no statistically significant causal effect of tax incentive policies on related or unrelated kidney
donation rates via a DiD estimation or an instrumental variable procedure which accounts for the endogenous
nature of the law. If anything, we find some weak evidence that enactment of tax incentives diminishes related
donations. While in theory this could represent crowding-out of altruistic behavior by money incentives, we
cannot rule out the possibility that instead we are observing mean regression.
When we account for this problem through a synthetic control method that allows for unobservable state
heterogeneity to vary over time, we find that the passage of tax incentive legislation increased living unrelated
kidney donation rates by about 52 percent in New York relative to a comparable synthetic New York in the
absence of legislation. We show that this causal effect is robust to the exclusion of any particular state as
well as to the use of a very small number of comparison states. It is possible that New York is unique, but
our methodology does not allow us to measure accurately effects in other states, so that we can neither rule
out nor confirm the efficacy of tax incentives elsewhere.
In short, our advances over prior literature are primarily to refine the methodological approach and the
legal accuracy of the data. Unlike earlier papers, our DiD techniques account for several possible dimensions
of endogeneity in the data, and accurately account for large variations in the value of the incentives offered.
We also show reasons to believe DiD estimates will tend to produce spurious negative correlations, and when
using methods robust to dropping the DiD assumptions find evidence that tax incentive legislation may
increase donations.
Section 2 discusses the background on state legislation, section 3 introduces our empirical strategy where
we respectively define tax incentive legislation as a binary treatment, a non-binary endogenous treatment
and finally allow for heterogenous causal effects of the law, section 4 discusses the findings of the analysis
with respect to methodological differences and identification strategies and section 5 concludes.
2 Background and Prior Literature
2.1 Statutory Background
In 1984, the U.S. Congress enacted the National Organ Transplantation Act ( NOTA)3. NOTA established
a network of sub-national organ procurement organizations (OPO), each with jurisdiction spanning about
3See Satel and Hippen (2007) for more details on NOTA.
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one state on average. These OPOs have primary responsibility for soliciting organ donations and matching
patients in need with eligible donors.
NOTA also prohibited trade in organs, but at the time of its initial enactment it was unclear whether this
prohibition extended to bar reimbursement of donor expenses. During the 1990s, state government interest
in encouraging organ donation swelled, but NOTA was seen as a possible obstacle to reform. For example,
in 2000 the Kansas Attorney General opined that NOTA prohibited a proposed law allowing tax deductions
for expenses associated with organ donation (Calandrillo, 2004). Congress responded in 2000 by amending
NOTA to clarify that reimbursements for lost wages, travel, and medical expenses associated with donating
would not contravene the Act.
Shortly thereafter, states began enacting moderate financial incentives for donations. Wisconsin was the
first, in 2000 granting its own employee donors up to 30 days of paid time off. Thirty other states followed
suit, most between 2001 and 2005.
Wisconsin was also the first state to adopt a reimbursement law, enacting a $10,000 tax deduction for
NOTA-permitted expenses in 2004. Fourteen states followed, eight of them in 2005, and most similarly
providing for a deduction against taxable income to the extent of covered expenses. The laws varied slightly
in some details, such as whether undeducted expenses could be carried forward to another tax year; Idaho
and Virginia provided for only a maximum $5,000 benefit. More significantly, Idaho, Louisiana and Utah
allowed for a credit, rather than a deduction, greatly increasing the actual dollar value of the incentive.
New York is of particular interest for methodological reasons we explain in more detail in Part 3.4. New
York adopted paid leave of absence for state employees in 2001. Bilgel (2014) finds no effect of that enactment
on donations. In February of 2004, New York passed a resolution awarding a medal of recognition for living
and deceased organ donors past and future. It then enacted a $10,000 deduction for donations in 2006.
2.2 Prior Literature
Boulware et al. (2008) were the first to examine whether these state policies were effective in encouraging
donations. Like others that followed, and us here, they focused on kidney donations. Kidneys are by far
the most frequently donated and demanded organ: approximately two-thirds of all organ donation waiting
lists are made up of patients awaiting kidneys. Boulware et al. (2008) pool together all the different state
interventions, and find no significant effects of enactment on cadaveric or living related donations. They do,
though, find that statistically significant impact of enactment, of about 26%, for living related donations.
They also report that growth in donation rates overall dropped sharply after a state’s first enactment of
any legislation, and that trends in end-stage renal disease between 1988 and 2005 appear to predict state
enactment.
Later studies aimed specifically at the effects of tax legislation found no significant effects. Wellington
and Sayre (2011) find no significant impact of tax incentives. Venkataramani et al. (2012) further examine
lags of the legislation and break out effects by demographic sub-groups, and still find no effects. Lacetera
et al. (2014) expand their analysis to include other organs as well as bone marrow, but find no effects for
kidney or other organ donations. All three studies rely on DiD methods and OLS. Lacetera et al. (2014)
control for lags of factors that might lead to enactment of legislation, such as lagged ESRD rates, but do not
actually use instruments for enactment of the legislation.
For the most part these studies treat all tax incentives uniformly. Venkataramani et al. (2012) and
Lacetera et al. (2014) note that Idaho offers a tax credit instead of a tax deduction, and report that their
results are robust to omitting Idaho. Wellington and Sayre (2011) provide an alternative specification in
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which they estimate the actual dollar value of a deduction by multiplying the maximum deduction amount
by the top marginal tax rate in the state. They do not identify any states that grant credits. As we noted
in section 2.1, in fact Louisiana and Utah also have credits. We also doubt that the Wellington and Sayre
(2011) approach closely approximates the dollar value of the state incentive; few donors likely are in the top
state bracket, not all donors itemize (and hence not all donors are even eligible to claim a deduction), and
federal deductibility of state taxes reduces the net value of the state incentive.
In addition to some question about the measurement of the tax variables, these earlier studies face
potential endogeneity issues, as well as with the choice of the DiD design. Since the urgency of obtaining
living donors is reduced when there are more plentiful cadaveric donors, and since controlling for cadaveric
donors may capture underlying trends in efforts to spur donations generally, it is sensible, as these papers do,
to control for cadaveric donations. But the urgency of obtaining cadaveric donations is also reduced when
living donations increase, suggesting the two variables may be endogenous to each other.
Further, the enactment of the tax incentives themselves may be correlated either with underlying levels
or trends in donations, or both enactment and donation levels may be driven by an unobservable such as the
organizational savvy of needy donees. Along these lines, Satel and Hippen (2007) offer an anecdote in which
the father of one child in need of a liver leveraged connections with members of Congress to obtain publicity
for his daughter’s plight.
Finally, we suspect that DiD approaches will be biased and inconsistent because of a failure of the common
trends assumption. States that will ultimately enact tax incentive legislation have higher average levels of
donations even years before enactment of the legislation. This raises the danger that enacting states may
regress to the mean around the time of enactment, violating the DiD assumption that state trends would
have been parallel if not for the treatment. Further supporting this inference, pre-enactment trends are not
fully parallel, though certainly similar. In some periods the two trend lines are moving in opposite directions.
If states are pooled by whether they ever enact any form of organ donor legislation, as in Boulware et al.
(2008), then trend lines actually cross prior to the first enactment date.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data and Sample
We use state-level panel data for the period 1988-2012. State data on the number of related and unrelated
living adult kidney donors, kidney waiting list additions (candidates) and the number of transplant centers
are retrieved from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN)4. Related donation is
composed of donations by blood related child, full sibling, half sibling, identical twin, other relative, parent,
spouse and life partner. Unrelated donation are composed of non-biological anonymous donations and other
unrelated directed donations only5.
Total state population and the population over the age of 18 are obtained from the US Census Bureau6.
The number of living related and unrelated kidney donors, the number of deceased kidney donations and
the number of transplant centers are measured in per million adult population (pmap) rates and the kidney
4http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
5Pairwise kidney exchanges (PKEs) have been excluded from unrelated donations although they are coded as such by OPTN.
The reason for excluding PKEs is that the decision to donate by a relative to a biologically unrelated person under pairwise
kidney exchange is conditioned upon his/her recipient receiving a kidney from another biologically unrelated person. Thus the
motivation under pairwise exchanges is not based upon the same reasons to donate under typical unrelated donations.
6http://www.census.gov/popest/states.html
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waiting list additions are measured in per million population (pmp) rates. The prevalence of ESRD pmp
is retrieved from the US Renal Data System (USRDS) 2010 Annual Report7. The real GDP per capita (in
2005 US dollars) and other state fiscal data are obtained from the US Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis and the Census Bureau8. The number of traffic fatalities are retrieved from the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS)9. The number
of cerebrovascular deaths are retrieved from CDC-WONDER10. Both variables are expressed in pmp rates.
3.1.1 Construction of the Tax Variables
We hand-collect the details of each state’s tax incentives for organ donation. We double-check our coding
against compilations by the National Kidney Foundation11, TransplantLiving12, National Conference of State
Legislatures13, Boulware et al. (2008) and Lacetera et al. (2014).
To generate the true dollar value of the incentives, we employed two alternative methods. Our results
are robust to either method. In the simpler approach, we rely primarily on the average state and federal
marginal rates facing all taxpayers in each state-year, as calculated by NBER (2013). In the second approach,
reflected in our reported results, we generate the average state and federal marginal rate for an itemizing
taxpayer in each state-year cell using NBER’s Taxsim calculator. As the inputs for the calculator, we take
the weighted mean income, household size, and claimed deductions from state-year aggregates reported by
the IRS Statistics of Income. These data are stratified by income band, and we weight the statistics for
each band by population and share of itemizers to arrive at an overall state-year weighted average. For
states with credits, we omit weighting by share of itemizers, to reflect the fact that credits can be claimed
by non-itemizers.
Both state and federal marginal rates affect the final value of the organ donor incentive. State income
taxes are deductible from federal taxes, and in some states federal taxes are deductible from the state income
tax base. State-level deductions thus reduce state tax but also thereby increase federal tax.14 In the simpler
case where state taxes are deductible federally but not vice-versa, the net dollar value of an incentive, I, is
therefore Iτs − (Iτsτf ) = (1− τf ) (Iτs) where τ indicates the relevant tax rate. Estimating the value of a
credit is more complex, because not all credit claimants need be federal itemizers. Since we cannot observe
how many credit claimants itemize, we assume as an approximation that they itemize at the average state
rate, and treat the expected federal cost of the credit as the product of the credit’s value and the odds of
itemizing. That is, we multiply the federal cost of state credits by the share of federal taxpayers claiming a
deduction for state taxes paid in each state-year cell, and subtract the resulting amount from the value of
the credit for each cell.
7http://www.usrds.org/reference.htm
8http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/
9www.-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/States/StatesFatalitiesFatalityRates.aspx.
10http://wonder.cdc.gov/controller/datarequest/D72;jsessionid=2D458CFDCFCF17D2F52A54B2A78D71FF
11http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/LivingDonors/pdf/LDTaxDed_Leave.pdf
12http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/financialaspects/legislation.aspx
13http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13383
14It is theoretically possible that some taxpayers will choose to itemize at the state level, due to the availability of the
organ-donation incentive, but will not itemize federally. If so, our coefficients for the effect of the tax incentive may be slightly
attenuated, as we will be somewhat underestimating the value of the incentive.
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3.2 Tax Incentive Legislation as a Binary Exogenous Treatment
3.2.1 Specification
We first investigate whether allowing for possible endogeneity in cadaveric donation rates produces results
different than prior literature, and for cross-check and verification purposes include baseline results treating
cadaveric donations as exogenous. In these specifications, we treat the tax incentive legislation as a binary
treatment and specify the following model in the panel data context:
yit = µi + δt + αiτit + γDit +X
′
itβ + εit (1)
where yit denote the living kidney donation rates pmap, i denotes the state i = 1, . . . , N , t denotes time
t = 1, . . . , T , µi, δt and αi respectively are the state and year fixed effects and state linear trend effects, D
is a binary treatment dummy that takes the value of 1 if the tax incentive legislation is in effect in state i
at time t and 0 otherwise, β is a K × 1 vector where K is the number time-variant regressors with possibly
endogenous elements and εit is the stochastic disturbance term that comprises idiosyncratic/transitory shocks,
measurement errors in yit and aggregation errors. Xit consists of the prevalence of ESRD pmp, the real per
capita GDP, the number of transplant centers pmap, the kidney waiting list additions pmp and the cadaveric
donation rate pmap. For the moment, we assume that the legislation is exogenous to kidney donations but
the cadaveric donation rate may not be exogenous.
To account for the possibility that cadaveric donations may be endogenous to living donations, a source
of exogenous variation should be found such that it might plausibly be viewed as randomly moving around
cadaveric donations. The likelihood of becoming a deceased donor (in the medical sense) is greater for
individuals who have been exposed to situations in which irreversible brain injury resulting in brain death is
more likely. Consequently, given medical compatibility, victims of motor vehicle accidents and cerebrovascular
diseases are suitable cadaveric donor candidates (Bilgel, 2013). There is no evident relation between these
two variables and living donations, except through their impact on cadaveric donations. Therefore, the
cerebrovascular death rates and the motor vehicle fatalities are identified as sources of exogenous variation
that are conjectured to be correlated with living related or unrelated kidney donation rates through and only
through cadaveric donations and that are robust candidates to be treated as instruments.
Bertrand et al. (2004) show that with serially correlated outcome variable, the DiD estimator leads
to inconsistent standard errors, serious overestimation of t-statistics and significance levels. The simplest
solution to this problem is to ignore the time-series information to compute the standard errors by averaging
the data before and after the passage of the legislation and run equation (1) in a panel of length two. However,
when the laws are staggered over time as various states passed tax incentive legislation at various points in
time, we regress yit on state and year fixed effects, linear trends and covariates and then divide the residuals
of the states that passed the legislation into two groups and average them for the pre- and the post-legislation
period. We then regress these residuals on the treatment dummy in a panel of length two and adjust the
standard errors for small sample.
3.2.2 DiD Results
Table 1 shows the estimation results for living related (columns 1 through 3) and unrelated (columns 4 through
6) kidney donation rates with an exhaustive set of diagnostics on endogeneity, instrument relevance, weak
identification, instrument validity and linearity. When the excluded instruments are only weakly correlated
with the endogenous variable, the instrumental variable estimates will be biased in the same direction as the
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OLS and the significance tests will have incorrect size and confidence interval. Therefore, we further report
weak identification-robust inference test results.
In order to check for the endogeneity of cadaveric donations, we first perform a DiD estimation via LIML
where we instrument cadaveric donation rates with cerebrovascular deaths, motor vehicle fatalities and their
squares (columns 1 and 4). While the diagnostic test results indicate that the instruments are relevant
(correlated with cadaveric donations), clean (uncorrelated with errors) and correctly excluded, they also
indicate that the null hypothesis that cadaveric donations may actually be treated as exogenous cannot be
rejected at conventional test levels. We next perform a LIML estimation and disregard the exogeneity of
cadaveric donations (columns 2 and 5). As methods with asymptotic foundations tend to perform poorly
in small samples, in columns 2 and 5, we report two-way cluster-robust bootstrapped standard errors à la
Cameron et al. (2011) (henceforth CGM)15. Finally, based on the diagnostics in columns 1 and 4, we treat
cadaveric donations as exogenous and perform the residual aggregation method, suggested by Bertrand et al.
(2004) to overcome serially correlated outcomes and staggered laws (columns 3 and 6).
In line with Wellington and Sayre (2011), Venkataramani et al. (2012) and Lacetera et al. (2014), the DiD
results in table 1, irrespective of the estimation strategy, show that the tax incentive legislation does not exert
a causal effect on living related or unrelated kidney donation rates. Albeit statistically indistinguishable from
zero, a crowding-out is evident under related donations. However, these results most likely suggest a failure
of the DiD design. One of the basic identifying assumptions in a DiD study is that treatment and control
states would have continued on parallel trends if not for the treatment. As we noted, treatment states here
tended to have higher levels of donations prior to enactment. Regression to the mean is to be expected, and
would also tend to produce a negative sign for enactment.
We cannot definitively rule out mean regression and similar possibilities as an explanation for our results.
For example, it might be that enacting states were also leaders in private methods for encouraging donations,
which if true would tend to produce a spurious negative correlation between enactment and donations. A
similar story would be that efforts to reach out to donors and to lobby legislators were conducted hand
in hand, and that both peaked with successful enactment of tax incentives. Here, too, we would expect a
decline in donations following enactment, which again would violate the but-for-enactment common trends
assumption.
A potentially serious caveat of these models is that the law may not be exogenous to kidney donations. If
true, our DiD estimations will be biased and inconsistent. Therefore, in the next section, we re-define the tax
incentive legislation as a non-binary endogenous treatment and invoke an instrumental variable procedure
where we search for an exogenous source of variation in the legislation.
3.3 Tax Incentive Legislation as a non-binary Endogenous Treatment
3.3.1 Specification
We next investigate whether accurately measuring the tax variables may produce different results than prior
literature. As described in 3.1.1 above, we estimate the actual mean dollar value of each state’s incentive,
and substitute it for the binary tax variable employed in 3.2. We also allow for the possibility that incentive
statutes are endogenous to donation rates. For example, legislators may respond to perceived need, or
communities that are effective in organizing donors may also be effective in organizing political activism.
15We use xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2010) and weakiv (Finlay et al., 2013) commands in STATA, available at:
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456501.html (xtivreg2), http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457684.html (weakiv).
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Therefore, in this section, we treat tax incentive legislation as a non-binary endogenous treatment and
specify the following model:
yit = µi + δt + γTit +X
′
itβ + εit (2)
where the treatment, T , is the mean value of state incentive for donations, the remaining variables are
defined as before and all elements of X are assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term. The treatment
might be correlated with factors that the specification does not already capture.
It is difficult to identify convincing instruments for the existence and value of the tax incentives. Boulware
et al. (2008) report that trends in ESRD predict state legislative action. We compute the ESRD trend for
each state from 1988 to 2002 (two years before the first tax incentive was enacted). We interact this trend
with average federal marginal rates facing itemizers in each state, and include the interaction term, the rate,
and the squared rate as instruments for the tax price of donating.
Alternately, we replace the trend interaction term with the share of state Medicaid expenses paid by
the federal government (state FMAP rate), its square, and the product of FMAP and average tax rate.
Organ transplantation is a long-run cost saver (Matas and Schnitzler, 2004). However, in the presence of
vertical fiscal externalities, such as the Medicaid matching grant, states have lower incentives to adopt cost-
saving legislation. We expect that FMAP will therefore be negatively correlated with donation incentives.
Admittedly, both FMAP and mean federal marginal rate face the difficulty that they are in part determined
by state income levels, which may also affect organ donations. We do, however, control in several ways for
state income level and economic activity. Testing of our instruments produces first-stage F scores of less than
10, hence we employ LIML, which is robust to weak instruments.
3.3.2 LIML Results
Table 2 displays the estimation results for the natural log of living related (columns 1-4) and unrelated
(columns 5-8) kidney donation rates. Columns 1 and 5 show our baseline specifications where the mean
value of state incentive for donation is instrumented by the IIT marginal rate, the federal medicaid matching
grant to state and their squares. In columns 2-4 and 6-8 we perform a robustness check for our baseline
specification where we include health spending, unemployment rate, share of itemizers, state median income,
share of black population, total population, state medicaid spending and two dummy variables capturing the
enactment of paid leave of absence for public and private employees as additional control variables.
While under unrelated donation rates, the sign of the effect of the mean value of state incentive for donation
is conformable to our expectations, the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional test
levels. On the other hand, taken at face value, we find a marginally statistically significant and negative effect
of the enactment of tax laws on related donations in column 4 only. Specifically, we find that enactment
reduces related donations by about 4.5 percent, significant only at the 10% level16. It is possible this outcome
represents a crowding-out of altruistic donations by explicit monetary incentives. Prior literature reports some
instances of this kind of crowding, mostly in laboratory settings (Gneezy et al., 2011). As discussed in section
3.3.1, however, the negative coefficients may also be artifacts of the DiD design.
We next attempt to implement a research design that allows unobservable state heterogeneity to vary
over time.
16We additionally performed OLS estimations whose results are slightly smaller in magnitude, with reductions of between 1.2
and 2.3% depending on specification, and significant at the 5% level. We obtain similar results for the effects of tax incentives
only in states that also enacted paid leave and for regressions including interactions between the tax and paid leave variables.
These additional estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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3.4 Heterogenous Causal Effects
In this secton, we attempt to reveal the causal effect of tax incentive legislation by imputing the missing
potential outcome, that is the (counterfactual) outcome that would have prevailed if states had not passed the
legislation. For this purpose, we invoke the synthetic control method, developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) and extended by Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2014). Suppose there are S+1 states, indexed
by i = 1, 2, . . . , S+1 over T periods, t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Only state i = 1 passed the legislation and the remaining
S states are the potential control states that did not pass any legislation, called the donor pool. There are T0
number of pre-legislation periods and T1 number of post-legislation periods so that T0 + T1 = T . The effect
of the law for unit i at time t is given by αit = Y Iit −Y Nit where Y Iit is the living kidney donation rate of state
i if the legislation is enacted in T0 + 1 to T and Y Nit is the living kidney donation rate in the absence of law.
Since only state i = 1 enacted the legislation, we need to estimate (α1T0+1, . . . , α1T ). We first estimate Y Nit
by the following factor model:
Y Nit = δt + θtZi + λtµi + εit (3)
where δt is an unknown common factor invariant across units, Zi is the covariate vector not affected by
the law, θt is a vector of unknown time-specific parameters, λt is a vector of unknown common factors, µi is
the state-specific unobservable and the error term εit are the zero-mean transitory shocks. The presence of
anticipatory effects are irrelevant in our case, implying that all the elements in Zi that belong to pre-legislation
period are unaffected by the law. Equation (3) allows the effect of unobservable state heterogeneity to vary
over time. In the panel DiD estimator, the effect of unobservable heterogeneity, λt, is assumed to be fixed
over time. Hence, the synthetic control method provides an improvement over the DiD method and deals
better with endogeneity caused by the presence of time-varying unobservable confounders.
The method aims to construct the missing counterfactual, Y Nit , from states not affected by the law.
Let W = (w2, . . . , wS+1)
′
be (S × 1) vector of weights such that 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 for j = 2, 3, . . . , S + 1 and∑S+1
j=2 wj = 1. Define the linear combination of pre-legislation values of living kidney donation rates by
Y¯ kj =
∑T0
m=1 kmYjm. Abadie et al. (2010) shows that if the following conditions hold, then the estimate of
the effect of the law for the enacted state, αˆ1t = Y1t −
∑S+1
j=2 w
∗
jYjt, is an unbiased estimator of α1t:
∑S+1
j=2 w
∗
jZj = Z1 ∧
∑S+1
j=2 w
∗
j Y¯
k
j = Y¯
k
1 (4)
where w∗j is the weight assigned to the jth state that did not enact the law.
Equation (4) can hold exactly only if
(
Y¯ k1 , Z1
)
belongs to the convex hull of
[(
Y¯ k2 , Z2
)
, . . . ,
(
Y¯ kP+1, ZP+1
)]
.
This means it is possible that the pre-legislation living kidney donation rate of some of the legislation-enacted
states may not be synthetized accurately using the pre-legislation characteristics of the states that did not
enact such legislation.
The vector W ∗ is chosen to minimize the distance between the vector of pre-legislation characteristics
for the exposed state (X1) and the weighted matrix that contains the pre-legislation characteristics of un-
exposed states (X0): ‖ X1 −X0W ‖=
√
(X1 −X0W )′ V (X1 −X0W ) where V is a symmetric and positive
semidefinite matrix. This minimization procedure is subject to the constraints that the weight assigned to
each unexposed state should lie between zero and one and that the sum of the weights is bounded by one.
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3.4.1 Treatment and Control Selection
Until 2012, 18 states in the U.S passed tax incentive legislation and 15 states did not enact any type of
legislations. Of the 18 states that passed tax incentive legislation, Idaho was discarded due to lack of data
on the number of living kidney donors and 14 states (Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, Missisippi, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin) were discarded
because they have already enacted paid leave of absence legislation (i.e. one cannot isolate the effect of paid
leave and the effect of tax incentive legislation). The only exception to this case is New York where the paid
leave of absence legislation (2001) is shown not to exert a causal effect on living unrelated kidney donation
rates (Bilgel, 2014). Therefore the effect of the following tax incentive legislation (2006) in New York can
be isolated17. This leaves three treatment states (Louisiana, Rhode Island and New York) to be used in the
synthetic control. On the other hand, of the 15 states that enacted none of the above laws, 2 states (Montana,
Wyoming) were discarded due to lack of data on the number of living kidney donors. This leaves a total of
13 states to be considered in the donor pool. Table 3 displays the assignment of treated and donor states.
The set of characteristics used to synthetize the outcome variables, the living related and unrelated kidney
donation rates per million adult population (pmap) are the living related and unrelated kidney donation rates
of the control states without any legislation for every year in the pre-legislation period, kidney waiting list
additions per million population (pmp), deceased kidney donations pmap, the number of transplant centers
pmap, the prevalence of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) pmp, traffic fatalities pmp, cerebrovascular deaths
pmp and real GDP per capita for the period 1988-2010. The living related and unrelated kidney donation
rates were available for each year under consideration, hence used for every year in the pre-legislation period.
The remaining covariates are used when available at least for one year in the pre-legislation period.
In the final specification, we dropped all the covariates except the living kidney donation rates of the
unexposed control states for every year in the pre-legislation period because neither did other covariates
improve the pre-legislation fit of the trajectory of the living kidney donation rates nor yield accurate donation
rate trajectories when all the covariates except the living kidney donation rates of the unexposed control states
were used. This implies that the pre-legislation actual donation trajectory is best reproduced by some linear
combination of the donation rates of the unexposed states.
3.4.2 Synthetic Control Results
Among the three treated states, Rhode Island is discarded from the analysis because the tax incentive
legislation is enacted in 2009, leaving only four years to analyze the causal effect of the legislation in the
post-legislation period as our sample ends in 2012. The results of the synthetic control and the subsequent
placebo studies for Louisiana are not reported either because the synthetic control method was unable to
reproduce the pre-legislation donation rate trajectory. We also omit the results of the synthetic controls
and the subsequent placebo studies for related donations because the synthetic control method was unable
to successfully reproduce the pre-legislation related donation rate trajectory in any of these three treated
states. We therefore report here and in the following sections the results of the analysis for New York and for
unrelated donation rates only. The entire analysis for Rhode Island and Louisiana or for New York’s related
donation rates is available from the authors upon request.
The pre-legislation period for New York is 18 years. With a large number of pre-legislation periods,
17Employing the synthetic control method, Bilgel (2014) was unable to confirm the presence or the absence of a causal effect
of paid leave of absence legislation in 12 out of 16 states in the U.S. Of the remaining four states, the paid leave of absence
legislation was found to be effective only in California.
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matching on pre-legislation outcomes allows to control for heterogenous responses to multiple unobserved
factors. The intuition is that only states that are alike in both observed and unobserved determinants as
well as in the effect of those determinants on kidney donation rates should produce similar trajectories of the
kidney donation rates over extended periods of time (Abadie et al., 2014).
Figure 1 plots the trends in living unrelated kidney donation rates for New York and its synthetic counter-
part over the period 1988-2012. The synthetic living unrelated kidney donation rate trajectory is constructed
by using the convex combination of states in the donor pool that closely resembled New York before the
passage of tax incentive legislation18. The synthetic unrelated donation rate trajectory almost perfectly re-
produces the actual unrelated donation rate trajectory in the pre-legislation period. In the next sseven years
following the passage of tax deduction legislation, the synthetic unrelated donation rate takes a dive while
the actual unrelated donation rate in New York rises.
The estimate of the impact of tax deduction legislation is given by the difference between the actual and
the synthetic unrelated kidney donation rates in the post-legislation period. Our findings suggest that in
the post-legislation period, the living unrelated kidney donation rates in New York increased on average by
about 52 percent relative to a comparable synthetic New York in the absence of legislation19.
3.4.3 Inference
In order to ensure that a particular synthetic control estimate reflects the impact of the legislation (i.e. the
synthetic controls provide good predictors of the trajectory of living kidney donation rate in the pre-legislation
periods), we perform a series of falsification tests known as in-space placebo test, in which the legislation
period is artificially reassigned to each of the 13 states which did not enact tax deduction legislation and
shift the treated state into the donor pool (Abadie et al., 2010). If a particular state enacted the legislation
and other states did not, our expectation is that the control states that are subject to the synthetic control
method should not be affected by the legislation. Thus we should not observe actual and synthetic living
kidney donation rates diverge in the post-legislation period. Our confidence that a sizeable synthetic control
estimate reflects the effect of legislation would be severely undermined if similar or larger estimated kidney
donation rate gaps are obtained when the legislation is artificially assigned to states which did not enact such
legislation (Abadie et al., 2010).
The post-legislation living unrelated kidney donation rate gap in New York is the largest of all placebo
gaps and thus the effect of tax deduction legislation on living unrelated kidney donation rates in New York
is causal rather than a random effect. In order to assess whether the estimated effect is causal, the synthetic
control method is applied to estimate in-space placebo kidney donation gaps for every potential control
state in order to create a distribution of placebo effects. This distribution enables us to identify the exact
significance level of the estimated effect of the legislation. Our confidence that a sizeable synthetic control
estimate reflects the effect of the legislation would be severely undermined if the estimated gap fell well
inside the distribution of placebo gaps (Abadie et al., 2010). This would imply that our results are driven by
randomness rather than causality. In other words, a significant causal effect of the legislation in the treated
18We use the synth command in STATA, which can be found at http://www.stanford.edu/~jhainm/synthpage.html. All
synthetic control estimations are performed using the nested option. By default synth relies on a constrained quadratic
programming routine that finds the best fitting W-weights conditional on the regression-based V-matrix. With nested option,
the synth command embarks on a fully nested optimization procedure that searches among all (diagonal) positive semi-definite
V-matrices and sets of W-weights for the best fitting convex combination of the control states. See STATA synth help file for
more details.
19This causal effect is calculated by taking the ratio of the difference between the average unrelated donation rate of New
York and the average unrelated donation rate of the synthetic New York to the average unrelated donation rate of the synthetic
New York in the post-legislation period.
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state requires that the estimated effect should be unusually large relative to the distribution of placebo effects.
The estimated effect of the legislation for New York is evaluated by calculating the ratio of post-legislation
root mean square prediction error (henceforth RMSPE) to pre-legislation RMSPE that are equal to or greater
than the one for New York20. This ratio is the p-value that can be interpreted as the probability of obtaining
a post/pre-legislation RMSPE that is at least as large as the one obtained for New York when the legislation
is artificially and randomly reassigned to a state that did not enact such legislation.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of placebo effects for New York and for every 13 states in the donor pool
for unrelated donations. The estimated living unrelated kidney donation rate gap, by far, fell well outside
the distribution of placebo gaps. This means that, if a state would have been randomly selected from the
sample, the probability of obtaining a post/pre-legislation RMSPE ratio as high as that of New York would
be 1/14 = 0.0714. No control state in the sample achieves an equally high ratio.
3.4.4 Robustness Check
In this section, we perform a robustness check to test the sensitivity of the results to the changes in the
synthetic control state weights induced by the exclusion of any particular state from the sample as in Abadie
et al. (2014). From table 4, the synthetic New York is constructed by the weighted average of nine states,
namely Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, Nevada, Tennessee and Vermont. We
iteratively re-estimate our model to construct a synthetic New York excluding in each iteration one of the
states that was assigned a weight in table 4. We aim to assess the extent to which our results are driven by
any particular state. Figure 3 displays the results in which the black solid line is the actual living unrelated
donation rate, the black dashed line is the synthetic living unrelated donation rate of New York with all nine
weight-assigned states and the gray lines are the leave-one-out estimates.
The average of all nine leave-one-out estimates of the synthetic control (gray lines) are on average 0.1
percent higher than the actual living unrelated donation rate in New York (black solid line) in the pre-
legislation period, suggesting that the leave-one-out estimates yield very good fits. Further, the leave-one-out
estimates are 0.02 percent lower than the original synthetic New York (black dashed line) in the pre-legislation
period. In the post-legislation period, the average of all nine leave-one-out estimates of the synthetic control
are on average 4 percent higher than the original synthetic New York. The leave-one-out estimates of the
synthetic control are highly robust to the exclusion of any particular state.
3.4.5 Sparse Synthetic Controls
In this section, we create synthetic controls that involve a small number of comparison units. Reducing the
number of states in the synthetic control allow us to examine the trade-off between sparsity and goodness of
fit in the choice of the number of states that contribute to the synthetic control for New York (Abadie et al.,
2014). Accordingly, we construct synthetic controls for New York allowing only combinations of eight, seven,
six, five, four, three, two, and a single control state respectively. For l = 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, and for all possible
combinations of l control states, we choose the one that produces the synthetic control unit that minimizes
20The pre-legislation RMSPE is
(
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(
Y1t −
∑s+1
j=2 w
∗
j Yjt
)2)1/2
and the post-legislation RMSPE is(
1
T1
T1∑
t=T0+1
(
Y1t −
∑s+1
j=2 w
∗
j Yjt
)2)1/2
where T0 and T1 are the number of pre- and post-legislation periods respectively, w∗j Yjt
is the synthetic outcome using the jth unexposed state with weight w∗ and Y1t is the actual outcome of the treated state.
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the minimum RMSPE21.
Table 5 shows the states and weights for the sparse synthetic controls and the compromise in terms of
goodness of fit that results by reducing the number of states, l, that contribute to the synthetic control.
The states contributing to the sparse versions of the synthetic control for New York are subsets of the set of
nine states contributing to the synthetic control in the baseline specification. Nevada has the largest weight
in the majority of the cases. Overall, relative to the baseline synthetic control with nine states, the loss in
goodness of fit (as shown by the corresponding RMSPE in table 5) is very low for l = 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3. For the
case of l = 1, 2, the goodness of fit is significantly poor, showing a substantial gap between the actual and
the synthetic living unrelated kidney donation rates.
Figure 4 shows the living unrelated kidney donation rate trajectory for New York and sparse synthetic
controls with l = 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. The sparse synthetic controls in figure 4 produces results that are highly
similar to the original synthetic control shown in figure 1 for cases where l > 2. However, for two and one
control states, the pre-legislation fits are very poor. This suggests that using combinations of states rather
than a single or two comparison units is important in terms of matching pre-legislation kidney donation rates.
4 Discussion
In sum, when we employ methods that do not depend on the assumptions of traditional DiD designs, we
find evidence consistent with the possibility that tax incentives encourage unrelated kidney donations. While
we are only able to identify this evidence clearly in New York, it is possible that other states’ statutes are
similarly effective. Again, our methodology does not allow us to say one way or the other. We also cannot
say for certain whether the effect we observe is due solely to New York’s tax statute, or to some combination
of the tax and “medal” statutes.
To the extent New York is relatively unique, that outcome would not be wholly surprising. The mean
dollar value we compute for New York’s incentive is the highest of any deduction-granting state, at $665
net of federal tax. Our regression results suggest that income levels can affect donations, and New York is
one of the highest-earning states. And, in regressions we run only in states enacting some form of incentive
legislation, we find that population is strongly and significantly correlated with donations, with a coefficient
of about 2.022. In other words, if we were going to find an effect in any state, it would probably be New
York.
Six hundred sixty-five dollars is a small sum for undertaking life-threatening surgery, but we think our
results are nonetheless plausible. Many would-be donors cite cost as a barrier to donation (Knotts et al.,
1996). Financial barriers to donation may be as low as $500, although they may also range into the low five
figures (Johnson et al., 1999). Becker and Elias (2007) offer a back-of-the-envelope estimate of nonmonetary
costs of about $5,000. The impact of New York’s incentive may be not to generate new donors, but to instead
to ease these cost barriers for those already inclined to donate. The symbolic and publicity value of the law’s
enactment may also loom larger than the dollar amount itself (Healy, 2010).
While we hesitate to draw strong conclusions from one state, at a minimum our results suggest the
importance of continued research into organ-donor incentives. In 2007, the President’s Council on Bioethics
21The combination of 8 states out of all 9 weight-assigned states in the baseline specification is C98 =
9!
8!(9−8)! = 9 meaning
that there are 9 set of combinations each consist of 8 control states. Similarly, C97 = 36, C
9
6 = 84..., so on and so forth. Repeating
this exercise for combinations of 5,4,3,2 and 1, we get 8 groups and a total of 510 set of combinations and thus 510 synthetic
control estimations. From each group, we pick the one that has the minimum RMSPE which leads to the output in table 5.
22Healy (2010) Ch. 3 also reports that population density and income are important determinants of donations.
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recommended experiments with a variety of financial incentives for organ donation (Crowe et al., 2007).
Momentum for those policies has slowed considerably in the wake of the string of findings that existing
incentives have had minimal impact. Yet policies that further expand the pool of donors have enormous
potential benefits; for example, even a 5% increase in living donations could add roughly 11,000 quality-
adjusted life years for ESRD sufferers (Barnieh et al., 2013).23
More generally, our findings provide a cautionary note for those who have argued, following Titmuss
(1970), that government-provided financial incentives will tend to crowd out altruistic behavior. The set of
circumstances that may have given rise to the appearance of crowding out here could easily appear in other
settings. Organizations skilled in motivating their members to work together for altruistic goals may be
readily able to translate those skills to political success (Andrews and Edwards, 2004). It is natural to expect
that the group’s efforts might drop off after legislative agreement to pursue the group’s goals (Peltzman,
1973). Our findings suggest that DiD methods may lead to spurious evidence of crowding out, in turn
implying that financial incentives may be more efficacious than prior literature suggests.
5 Conclusion
We used state-level panel data for the period 1988-2012 in order to reveal the causal impact of tax incentive
legislation on living kidney donation rates in the U.S states. For the sake of completeness and for purposes
of cross-validation, we first performed a DiD approach that accounts for several possible dimensions of
endogeneity. Then we invoked an instrumental variables approach that accounts for large variations in
the value of the incentives offered and the endogeneity of the law. Finally, we employed the synthetic
control method that accounts for time-varying unobserved state heterogeneity. The latter method is based
on estimating the counterfactual: how the state living related and unrelated kidney donation rates would
have evolved in the absence of legislation.
Contrary to prior efforts, we have found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that tax incentives for
organ donation increase donations. We argue that failure of the parallel trends assumption gives rise to
a spurious negative correlation between enactment and donations. While the DiD and the instrumental
variables approaches indicate no statistically significant average causal effects of tax incentive policies on
related or unrelated kidney donation rates, the synthetic control method reveals that tax incentives increased
living unrelated kidney donation rates in New York by about 52 percent in the post-legislation period (from
2006 to 2012) relative to a comparable synthetic New York in the absence of legislation. We further show
that our synthetic control estimate is highly robust to the exclusion of any particular state. Our methods
can neither rule out nor confirm that other states’ policies were similarly effective. These results may be
significant not only for health policy, but also for government efforts to encourage other-regarding behavior
generally.
23See Cook and Krawiec (2014) for a wider discussion.
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Table 3: Synthetic Control States
Treated States Donor States
Louisiana Alabama North Carolina Nevada
Rhode Island Arizona Nebraska South Dakota
New York Florida New Hampshire Tennessee
Kentucky New Jersey Vermont
Michigan
Table 4: Synthetic Control Weights for New York, Living Unrelated Kidney Donation
State Weight
Alabama 0.179
Arizona 0.177
Florida 0.107
Michigan 0.074
Nebraska 0.020
New Jersey 0.058
Nevada 0.269
Tennessee 0.089
Vermont 0.027
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Table 5: Synthetic Weights from Combination of Control States, New York
Synthetic State and Weights
Combination RMSPE MI NV AL AZ TN FL VT NJ NE
Nine control states 0.1658 0.074 0.269 0.179 0.177 0.089 0.107 0.027 0.058 0.020
Eight control states 0.1681 0.088 0.287 0.194 0.172 0.091 0.093 0.029 0.045
Seven control states 0.1693 0.058 0.316 0.201 0.194 0.095 0.108 0.027
Six control states 0.1760 0.107 0.322 0.182 0.200 0.077 0.111
Five control states 0.1854 0.106 0.418 0.209 0.183 0.083
Four control states 0.2072 0.129 0.433 0.257 0.180
Three control states 0.2619 0.202 0.428 0.370
Two control states 0.5122 0.706 0.294
One control state 1.0500 1.000
Note: States and weights are constructed from the best fitting combination of nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, three, two
and one states.
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B Figures
Figure 1: Living unrelated kidney donation rate trajectories: New York vs. synthetic New York
23
Figure 2: In-space placebo distributions, living unrelated kidney donation
24
Figure 3: Leave-one-out distribution of the synthetic control, living unrelated kidney donation
25
Figure 4: Living unrelated kidney donation rate gaps between New York and sparse synthetic controls
(a) Number of control states: 8 (b) Number of control states: 7
(c) Number of control states: 6 (d) Number of control states: 5
(e) Number of control states: 4 (f) Number of control states: 3
(g) Number of control states: 2 (h) Number of control states: 1
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